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indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an 
obstruction to the free use of property, so 
as to interfere with the comfortable 
enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance 
and the subject of an action. Such action 
may be brought by any person whose property 
is injuriously affected, or whose personal 
enjoyment is lessened by nuisance; and by the 
judgment the nuisance may be enjoined or 
abated, and damages may also be recovered. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61 24 
HARMLESS ERROR. No error in either the 
admission or the exclusion of evidence, and 
no error or defect in any ruling or order or 
in anything done or omitted by the court or 
by any of the parties, is ground for granting 
a new trial or otherwise disturbing a 
judgment or order, unless refusal to take 
such action appears to the court inconsistent 
with substantial justice. The court at every 
stage of the proceeding must disregard any 
error or defect in the proceeding which does 
not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties. 
iv 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103 (a) 24 
RULINGS ON EVIDENCE. 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may 
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits 
or excludes evidence unless a substantial 
right of the party is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one 
admitting evidence, a timely objection or 
motion to strike appears of record, stating 
the specific ground of objection, if the 
specific ground was not apparent from the 
context; or 
(2) Offer of Proof. In case the ruling is 
one excluding evidence, the substance of the 
evidence was made known to the court by offer 
or was apparent from the context within which 
questions were asked. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403 18, 24 
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Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
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confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sections 826-829 14 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
There are four main questions of law presented by this 
appeal: 
1 • Is a party to a stipulation which in major part 
limits the height of a barrier wall between adjoining properties, 
precluded from enforcing such restrictions against subsequent 
barriers erected along the boundary between their properties in 
excess of the height limitations? 
2. Is the erection of a fence under the circumstances 
of this case a nuisance? This is a case of first impression for 
spite fence nuisance in Utah. The court has an opportunity to 
clearly set forth the law. 
3. Did the trial court properly exercise itfs 
discretion in the administration of the proceedings and the 
admission of evidence; specifically, did the court prejudically 
err in excluding evidence offered by the defendant? 
4. Is the injunctive relief granted by the court 
restricting barriers in excess of the stipulated height of the 
wall between the residence of the parties, precluded by 
Constitutional prohibitions against taking property without 
compensation? 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
All but one of the defendants1 numerous arguments and 
issues hinge on two dominant preceptions of the case and the law. 
These two views are, first, that the case involves the issue of an 
implied easement to light and air, and second that the court 
improperly excluded evidence. The final argument questions the 
constitutionality of the injunction imposed by court. 
1. The plaintiff's case was plead, proved and argued 
on the theories of contract and nuisance. As the defendant 
conceeds there are no Utah cases concerning implied easements for 
light and air. The defendants presume the Law in Utah to be 
similar to that of the majority of other jurisdictions: that there 
is no implied right to light and air. Defendants then argue that 
this presumption is supreme over other law applicable to the case. 
The defendants contend that both contracts in which 
restrictions on light and air may be implied from the express 
contract terms, and a nuisance which is based in part on 
interference with light and air must yield to the supposed 
prohibition to implied rights to light and air. 
In response, Plaintiffs argue that the established law 
of contract interpretation provides for a determination that an 
express agreement may, by implication, include prohibitions 
against activities that restrict light and air that are not 
individually stated. Defendants conceed that an easement may be 
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created by express grant. Similarly, plaintiffs respond that a 
nuisance is a broad category of objectionable activites which 
limit other property rights an individual may acquire by deed or 
contract. 
To have instructed the jury that a right to light and 
air could not be implied would have misstated the law of contracts 
and nuisance. 
2. The second major view of the case presented by 
several of the defendants1 arguments is that the defendants were 
precluded from presenting the evidence for their case at trial. 
The body of this brief will demonstrate that this is not true but 
rather that the defendants were allowed to proceed and did present 
evidence to support all of the defenses that they argued. Thus, 
if there was error, which is not admitted, it was harmless. 
3. The final argument presented by the defendants 
concerns the constitutionality of the injunctive relief granted. 
The relief ordered was primarily corrective; ordering the removal 
of the barriers found to be in violation of the stipulation and a 
nuisance. To a lesser extent the relief ordered was prescriptive; 
ordering the defendants to cease erecting "similar barriers11. 
The plaintiffs argue that the court's order merely 
restated the findings as to the meaning of original stipulation 
and the law of nuisance and is not beyond the normal power of a 
court to enforce it's orders and set forth the findings and the 
law. 
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The defendants cite no Utah authority for their 
position that the injunction is a taking where the prescribed 
activity is a nuisance, or prohibited by contract. 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS 
The defendants' statement of the case and facts is 
fairly adequate for the court1s understanding of the dispute 
except for the following omitted matters: 
1. Upon questioning at trial all parties agreed they 
had no prior disputes or problems and considered each other good 
neighbors until the wall was planned by the defendant, Mark 
Gallegos. (Mrs. Behunin, T-336; Mr. Behunin, T-438; Mrs. 
Gallegos, T-447; Mr. Gallegos, T-494) At trial the plaintiff, 
Mrs. Behunin testified that the defendant, Mark Gallegos told her 
he intended to construct a cinderblock wall ten (10) feet high 
along the entire length of the property line and that she would 
need her lights on night and day (T-339). Mrs. Gallegos testified 
that Mr. Gallegos threated to build the wall MForty feet tall, not 
ten11 (T-448, 449). The wall would have created a concrete 
obstruction two feet, two inches from the kitchen window; one 
foot, seven inches from the bedroom window; and one foot eleven 
inches from the bathroom window of the plaintiffs1 home (T-427 -
429). 
2. The plaintiff, Mrs. Behunin testified that 
subsequently she was contacted by Mr. Gallegos by telephone and 
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told, "Well I'm going up with that wall and itfs going to be dark 
in there and your1re going to have to leave your lights clear on 
all dayM (T-341). 
3. The plaintiffs obtained an attorney and filed a 
complaint and obtained a restraining order to stop the wall 
(T-343). The affidavits, complaint and answers to interrogatories 
emphasized the concern for loss of their view and light because of 
the anticipated height of the wall (T-356-359, Pleadings and 
Exhibits 54-P, 55-P). 
4. The stipulation, (Exhibit 53-P) resolving the 
dispute over the proposed wall was negotiated at a time when both 
parties were represented by counsel and was executed by both 
parties1 counsel (T-355 and T-452). The stipulation clarified the 
location and limited the height of the wall. 
(5) Almost immediately upon completion of the 
stipulated lower wall, the defendants placed 4 x 8 foot pieces of 
plywood on end against the wall directly in line with the 
plaintiffs1 windows (T-361-363). These unpainted plywood boards 
remained rattling (T-365) and blocking the plaintiff's light and 
I 
view (T-357, 358) until after the plaintiffs commenced the lawsuit 
(T-365). An eight foot high partition replacing the 4 x 8 plywood 
boards, was placed against the wall in 1982. It was built from 
wood and green fiberglass (T-366). This partition also blocked 
the light requiring the Plaintiffs lights to be on all the time 
(T-371) and blocked their view (T-395 and 383, Exhibits P-2, P-3, 
P-5 and P-6). 
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(6) After the wall was completed the parties 
relationship was not good (T-374). The defendants' placed signs 
in their windows facing the plaintiffs1 home. These signs 
alternately stated "Nosy JoseyM or ,fNosy Rosey" (T-376-378, 
Exhibits P-8 and P-11). The defendant often came into his yard 
when the plaintiffs were outside and made obscene gestures to them 
(T-375). On the barrier fence that was erected by the defendant 
between the property line at the sidewalk and their home, the 
defendant, Mr. Gallegos wrote in white spray paint, "Fence 
Inspector" (T-375, Exhibit P-13, T-515). 
(7) The court was presented with testimony attempting 
to show acts of the plaintiffs that were alleged to consist of 
unwarranted intrusion into the defendants affairs. Over 35 pages 
of such allegations were presented by defendants through three 
witnesses and their own testimony. Acts alleged included calling 
the police, looking over the wall, coming to the front yard to see 
who was at the defendants1 front door, making obscene gestures, 
watching construction in defendants' yard from the plaintiffs1 
roof, and watering and digging near the walL. By way of rebuttal 
the plaintiffs presented the testimony of one neighbor and one 
police officer as well as their own testimony. All testimony was 
limited to individual observations or knowledge. The plaintiffs1 
explained that they minded their own business. (The numerous 
factual references for the specific testimony and objections are 
contained in the body of the brief under Point III.) 
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(7) The evidence also showed that the defendants had 
only one front room window on the east side of their house facing 
the plaintiffs1 home (T-484 and 515) and that their yard extended 
to the west over a large distance which was unrestricted and 
available for improvements and use (T-486), and that the entire 
remaining perimeter of their property was fenced with a 6 foot 
high chain link fence (Exhibit D-37, T-507). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE BARRIERS ERECTED BY THE DEFENDANTS WERE A BREACH OF THE 
STIPULATION WHEREBY THE PARTIES INTENDED TO LIMIT THE HEIGHT OF 
BARRIERS ALONG THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THEIR PROPERTIES. 
A primary concern of the plaintiffs, beginning with the 
defendants1 declaration to build a 10 foot high wall and included 
in all pleadings and discussions was the height of the wall and 
the loss of their view and light. This concern about the height 
of the wall was incorporated into the restrictions of the 
stipulation as to the height of the wall. The stipulation 
provided at Paragraph 4 in part. 
"4. It is agreeable to the Plaintiffs that 
the Defendants be allowed to construct a 
cinderblock wall in accord with the 
dimensions hereinafter set out along the 
Western Boundary of Plaintiffs1 property, 
(the Eastern boundary of Defendants1 
property). This wall is to be placed upon 
the foundation which was constructed by 
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Defendants prior to the institution of this 
action against Defendants. The wall will 
be constructed of standard size and quality 
cinderblock. It shall commence on the 
Northwest corner of Plaintiffs1 property 
and thence run in a southerly direction 
along the Western boundary line of 
Plaintiffs1 property (the Eastern boundary 
line of Defendants' property) and shall be 
of a height not to exceed 4 feet including 
proper capping material. It shall continue 
at a height not exceeding 4 feet to the 
Northwest corner of Plaintiffs1 residence. 
At the Northwest corner of Plaintiffs1 
residence, the wall shall be increased to a 
height not to exceed 5 feet including 
proper capping material, and shall continue 
at a height not exceeding 5 feet until it 
reaches the Southwest corner of Plaintiffs' 
residence. At the Southwest corner of 
Plaintiffs' residence, the wall shall be 
increased to a height not exceeding 7 feet 
including proper capping material and shall 
continue at a height not exceeding 7 feet 
to its termination point at the Southwest 
corner of Plaintiffs' property (the 
Southeast corner of Defendants' property).,f 
(Emphasis added) 
Almost immediately upon completion of the wall plywood sheets 
eight (8) feet high were placed against the wall in the area of 
the plaintiffs windows. These were later replaced by redwood and 
green fiberglass barriers. 
The plaintiffs argued these actions were a breach of 
the terms of the stipulation. The stipulation included those 
terms implied from the express language of the stipulation as 
having been intended by the parties. The stipulation also 
included the duty of good faith and cooperation required by law. 
In State Auto & Casualty Underwriters v. Salisbury, 494 
P.2d 529 (Utah 1972) the court said at 531. 
Arising from what is commonly known and 
accepted as to customs and experience in 
everyday affairs of life, parties [to a 
-8-
contact] each have the right to Assume that 
the other will perform duties he agrees to 
do with reasonable care, competence, 
diligence and good faith even though such 
terms are not expressly spelled out in the 
contract. 
The jury found by special interrogatories the purpose 
and intent of the stipulation to be to "restrict obstruction to 
light, view and air along the boundary between their properties in 
a general way as well as to restrict the height of the wall 
generally11. 
This finding was not in conflict with the evidence. 
The testimony of all parties about the initial discussions about 
the wall related primarily to height, and td darkness in the 
plaintifffs house and loss of her view. Th^ height agreed upon of 
five (5) feet provided primarily for a view out the windows and 
was not to accomodate any other criteria. It is the traditional 
rule of the Utah court to review the evidende in the light 
favorable to the findings of the jury and judgment entered, State 
Auto, supra at 532. 
The placement of the plywood and subsequent barriers 
had the effect of breaching this intent and evidenced a lack of 
good faith and cooperation. It was not neceissary that the 
contract expressly exclude all types of boundaries since "common 
experience" would not lead individual neighbiors to expect plywood 
and other barriers to be subsequently erecte|d between them when 
the height of the boundary wall had been so arduously negotiated. 
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II. 
THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY PROVIDED LEGALLY SUFFICIENT 
GROUNDS TO SUPPORT THE FINDING OF A NUISANCE. 
A. 
The jury finding of nuisance was based on jury 
instructions that were consistent with the general view of spite 
fence nuisance law and were not inconsistent with the law that 
should be adopted by the Utah court. 
The only Utah nuisance case cited by the defendants1 
brief is the case of Rowley v. Marrcrest Homeowners Ass'n, 656 
P.2d 414 (Utah 1982) where in clear dicta at 419 the court states: 
As a general proposition, one who erects 
an otherwise useless structure for the sole 
purpose of injuring a neighbor makes an 
improper tise of his property. Sundowner, 
Inc. v. King, 95 Idaho 367, 509 P.2d 785 
(1973), Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich 380, 37 N. 
W. 838 (1888). 
The plaintiffs1 believe that Rowley does not state the 
correct law to be applied in this case. For this reason, this 
case and the evolution of the general proposition will be 
discussed in detail. The facts in spite fence cases are generally 
very similar to the case at bar. 
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In Sundowner, supra the parties had previously been in 
litigation concerning alleged misrepresentations in the sale of a 
motel property. The parties were adjoining property owners. One 
party built a structure described as a "fenqe or sign" 85 feet in 
length and 18 feet high approximately 2 feet from the adjoining 
property owner's motel building, restricting the passage of light 
and air to it's rooms. 
The court noted that the older caises or English rule 
were founded on the premise that the property owner has an 
absolute right to use his property in any matter he desires. This 
rule was rejected by Burke v. Smith (also cilted by the Utah Court 
in Rowley) which set forth what became known as the American Rule 
on spite fences. The rule' is most often expressed by quoting from 
Burke supra at 37 N.W. 842. 
But it must be remembered that no man 
has a legal right to make malicious use of 
his property, not for any benefit or 
advantage to himself, but for the avowed 
purpose of damaging his neighbor. To hold 
otherwise would make the law a cofivienent 
engine, in cases like the present^ to 
injure and destroy the peace and comfort, 
and to damage the property, of on$'s 
neighbor for no other than wicked purposes 
which in itself is or ought to be unlawful 
. . . what right has the defendant, in the 
light of just and beneficant principles of 
equity, to shut out God's free air and 
sunlight from the windows of his Neighbor, 
not for any benefit or advantage to 
himself, or profit to his land, biit simply 
to gratify his own wicked malice ^gainst 
his neighbor? 
The facts of the Sundowner case are important!. The defendant had 
alleged that the wall was useful for advertising purposes. 
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However, the court found that the wall did not serve a useful 
advertising purpose although it was used for advertising and 
ordered it reduced to six feet in height. 
The facts illustrate that the courts generally have 
expoused the dicta of Burke concerning no useful purpose while in 
fact making a finding of intent and disregarding an arguable 
"useful purposes". 
This is evident in a series of Wyoming cases in which 
the Wyoming court ultimately disgarded the Burke languge and 
adopted a more realistic statement of the law. 
In Erickson v. Hudson, 249 P.2d 523 (Wyo 1952), the 
litigants were adjoining property owners in Evanston, Wyoming, who 
had previously been involved in adjudication over the location of 
their property line. The fence complained of was constructed to a 
height of 6-1/2 feet and to within 5-1/2 inches of the eaves of 
the house and within 13 inches of a wall. The side facing the 
neighbor was painted with creosote which caused the plaintiff to 
become ill. The houses were only 6 to 7 feet apart. 
The justification for the fence was that it was built 
on the defendant's own property, served a useful purpose of 
providing privacy and kept peace with his neighbors. 
The court made this final determination at 532. 
That the defendants sought privacy and 
peace may be true, but the beneficial 
purpose of the fence in that connection, if 
any, at least as to the height of it is far 
out of proportion to the injury inflicted. 
Common sense dictates that it would be 
offensive to any neighbor whatever. The 
cause and underlying reason for the 
erection was the ill-feeling toward the 
plaintiffs . . . 
-12-
The court upheld an order reducing the fence to the 
height of the window sills. 
A subsequent Wyoming case Schork v. Epperson, 287 P.2d 
467 (Wyo 1955) was substantially similar in facts: a solid wooden 
fence was erected 9 feet high and came close to the eves of the 
house preventing it from receiving sunshine until almost noon and 
compelling the plaintiffs to use electric lights during the day. 
The defendants claimed it was useful as a windbreak and as a 
snowfence. 
The Wyoming court cited the Utah case of Dahl v. Utah 
Oil Refining Co., 71 Utah 1, 262 P. 269, (1927) and Cannon v. 
Neuberger, 1 Utah 2d 396, 268 P.2d 425 (1954) for the proposition 
that "the test of whether the use of the property constitutes a 
nuisance is the reasonableness of the use cqmplained of in the 
particular locality and in the manner and under the circumstances 
of the case", Dahl supra at 273. 
The court then noted that spite fence cases have not 
enjoyed this broader definition of nuisance. The court criticised 
the narrow interpretation of the American Rule set out in Burke 
supra requiring that "malice must be unmixed with any benefit to 
the party erecting the fence", Schork, at 470. The court cites 
cases that have held that "liability ensues when malice is the 
dominate factor and the usefulness of the structure is limited and 
merely incidental". 
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The court next examined the Restatement of the Law of 
Torts, Sections 826 to 829, intentional invastion of anothers 
land, which it notes does not adopt a "useful purpose" standard 
but rather balances the utility of the conduct to the gravity of 
the harm. 
Finally, the Court in Schork adopts a balancing 
standard of it's own at 470, 
The actor is liable "unless the utility 
of the actor's conduct outweighs the 
gravity of the harm." 
The plaintiffs believe the history of the Wyoming 
court's use of the American Rule and reasoning is pursuasive. The 
strict American Rule puts the plaintiff to the burden of 
disproving a "useful purpose" under some artificial criteria when 
infact it is obvious that a fence may be "useful", but that the 
"use" was not the purpose. Legal fictions create bad law, confuse 
the jury and obsure the true issues of the case. 
This view of the Wyoming court is consistent with the 
Utah Statutory definition of Nuisance. Section 78-38-1, Utah Code 
Annotated provides: 
Anything which is injurious to health, 
or indecent, or offensive to the senses, or 
an obstruction to the free use of property, 
so as to interfere with the comfortable 
enjoyment of life or property, is a 
nuisance and the subject of an action. 
Such action may be brought by any person 
whose property is injuriously affected, or 
whose personal enjoyment is lessened by 
nuisance; and by the judgment the nuisance 
may be enjoined or abated, and damages may 
also be recovered. 
-14-
This statute has been applied to numerous other 
nuisance circumstances such as Dahl, an Oil Refinery; Neuberger, a 
question of trees constituting nuisance; Brough v. Ute Stampede 
Assn., Inc., 105 U 446, 142 P.2d 670 (1943), a carnival adjacent 
to a home; Wade v. Fuller, 12 U.2d 299, 365 P.2d 802 (1961), 
operation of a drive-in cafe; and Ludlow v. Colorado Animal 
By-Products Co., 104 U. 221, 137 P.2d 347 (1943)a rendering plant 
in a farming community. The cases developed a balancing of 
interests tests in Utah, as best stated in Neuberger at 426: 
. . . our court . . . has never 
interpreted the first word of the statute 
to mean "anything at all which [(is)] any 
person considers to be offensive to the 
senses'1 etc. Rather it has held that the 
term "nuisance" is applied to "the 
unreasonable, unwarrantable or unlawful use 
by a person of his property", and that 
every person has a right to the reasonable 
enjoyment of his property. As to what is a 
reasonable use of one's property must 
necessarily depend upon the circumstances 
of each case for a use for a particular 
way, in one localilty, that would be lawful 
and a nuisance in another . . . The test of 
whether the use of property consitutes a 
nuisance is the reasonableness of the use 
complained of in the particular locality 
and in the manner and under the 
cirumstances of the case. 
This same test could be wisely applied in spite fence 
nuisance cases as it has been done in Wyoming. The reference in 
Rowley to the American Rule and Sundowner, are contrary to the 
statute and Utah case law. 
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B. 
The facts of the instant case clearly support the 
finding of the jury that the fence was of no beneficial use or 
purpose and that the fence was erected solely for the purpose of 
annoying the plaintiffs. This was the finding required by Jury 
Instruction 21 which was modified by the Court to clarify this 
point. Thus the presence of Instruction 21 put the plaintiff to 
the more severe test. The jury was free to disregard as 
unbelieveable the testimony of the defendants that the fence 
served the useful purpose of providing them privacy. Upon review 
this Court must view the facts in light most favorable to the 
findings of the jury, State Auto, supra at 532. 
Jury Instruction 18 is arguably at odds with 
Instruction 21. However, plaintiff believes that the two 
instructions are consistent and merely clarify the American Rule; 
i.e. whether a fence is installed solely for malice may require or 
permit the jury to disregard possible uses that are not actual 
uses. 
Jury Instructions 15 and 16 accurately state the 
definition of a nuisance generally as explained by the Utah 
statute and Utah cases. To the extent that Utahfs general law of 
nuisance is more broad than the American Rule of spite fence 
nuisance these instructions may apper inconsistent with 
Instructions 18 and 21. If this court were to adopt the American 
Rule, the juryfs instructions would, nevertheless, not have been 
unclear or in error. The jury was instructed that for a fence to 
be a nuisance it must be erected solely for purposes of malice. 
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The general explanations of nuisance were subordinate to this 
specific finding required by the instructions for a fence. This 
was not reversible error Morgan v. Mammoth Min. C o M 26 U 174, 72 
P. 688 (1903); In re Richards Estate, 5 U.2d 106, 297 P.2d 542 
(1956). 
Plaintiff argues that if there was error in the 
instructions, the error was the reference arfrd use of the American 
rule rather than the better rule applied in other Utah nuisance 
cases and expoused by the Wyoming court in ^chork, supra. This 
"error" was to the defendants1 favor and is not a basis for 
reversal or remand. 
III. 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE JURY AND THE EVIDENCE EXCLUDED 
WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANTS NOR BEYOND THE 
PROPER DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT 
The defendants in their brief argue at great length 
that the trial court improperly excluded admissable evidence. The 
evidence that is thought to have been excludied was, infact, 
usually not excluded, but merely limited either because of the 
court's impatience that so much of such evidence had been admitted 
throughout the proceedings or because the defendants1 counsel 
failed to pursue the area further. 
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The areas felt by defendants to have been inadequately 
presented are identified in their brief as follows: 
(a) Plaintiffs alleged excessive summoning of the 
police; 
(b) Opinions of neighbors concerning the plaintiff's 
reputations for invasion of the privacy of others; 
(c) Privacy problems of the defendants requiring the 
wall; 
(d) (h) and (i) Defendants' actions related to 
possibly undermining the wall. 
(e) Telephone calls to building inspectors related to 
the wall; 
(f) The opinion of the plaintiff concerning the 
allegations in the Complaint; and 
(g) The opinion of the defendant concerning the intent 
of the settlement stipulation relative to light and air. 
As the defendants conceed in their brief, disputes 
between neighbors are often unpleasant and lead to name calling 
and mud slinging. The plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their actions 
for defamation and intentional infliction of mental distress. 
Their strategy was to preclude the type of bickering that would 
have undermined the sympathies of the jury and prevented a 
determination of the crucial issues. 
This was also the burden of the trial court. Rule 403 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence recognizes the need for discretion 
of the trial court to balance relevancy with the risks of 
prejudice confusion, undue delay or needless presentation of 
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cumulative evidence. This discretion is not to be disturbed 
unless it clearly appears that the trial court so abused it's 
discretion that there was a likelihood that injustice resulted. 
State v McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah, 1982). 
The potential for prejudice, delay and confusion was 
particularly high in this case because of the large number of 
extraneous issues between the parties, the Uack of specific 
complaints and temptation to introduce evidence of innuendo or 
general conclusions as to character. Plaintiffs believe the 
complete record shows the court judiciously balanced the numerous 
factors to see that justice resulted and that there was no abuse 
of this discretion. 
In specific response to the defendants individual 
objections the plaintiff makes the following observations: 
(a) and (e) The specific objection of defendants is an 
inability to introduce evidence that Mrs. Belhunin called the 
police and building inspector often. 
The plaintiff was questioned by defendant's counsel 
concerning the calls to the building inspect&r. She testified 
without objection. Counsel then asked about inspection papers. 
Since the plaintiffs did not contend that th£ wall was built 
without compliance, this question was objected to as being 
irrelevant. The objection was sustained and the defendants' 
counsel moved to other areas of cross examination (T-390). This 
line of questioning was not renewed with any other witness. 
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Mrs. Behunin did not testify on direct examination to 
calling the police. The court on it's own, objected to the 
questions by defendants' counsel about police calls as being 
beyond the scope of the questioning on direct testimony (T-402). 
Prior to the courts objection Mrs. Behunin testified she had 
called the police when given an obscene gesture by the defendant 
and on quite a few occasions (T-401). The court's objection did 
not precluded the defendants from testifyincj on these matters on 
direct or of asking other witnesses about police calls, but no 
questions were asked. The plaintiffs introduced the testimony of 
a police officer, (T-422) called by the plaintiffs concerning a 
loud music disturbance. He testified the music was loud enough to 
justify a complaint and that the defendant told the officer's 
partner, "He didn't really care what [they] had to say, he was 
going to do what he darn well liked" (T-424). Again, following 
this testimony, the defendants failed to offer testimony of their 
own or other witnesses including any police officers or public 
officials to testify that they received calls that were not 
justified. 
The court's single objection was correct. The failure 
to proceed further at a later time precluded the testimony, not 
the court. 
(b) and (c) Plaintiffs' reputation for snoopiness. 
The court permitted over 37 pages of testimony by five witnesses 
concerning the problems the defendants had with the plaintiff. 
At T-437 - 439 the defendants' counsel questioned Mr. 
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Behunin concerning his activities near the wall and while the wall 
was being built. 
At T-454, and T-457, Mrs. Gallegos testified about 
"problems" with the plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs1 counsel objected. Plaintiffs contended 
that problems after the wall and barriers were erected were not 
relevant to the question of motive for building the wall and 
erecting the barriers. Nevertheless, the court permitted the 
defendant to ask about the plaintiffs' activities that justified 
erecting the barriers in addition to the wall. 
Mrs. Gallegos testified concerning one incident of Mr. 
Behunin possibly looking over the wall in his back yard (T-457). 
She also was allowed to testify about the plaintiffs coming to the 
front yard when the defendants had quests (T-459). She testified 
about Mr. Behunin often walking between the wall and his 
house,(T-461) and being on the roof when the defendants' 
contractor was pouring a patio in the defendantsf back yard 
(T-462-463). Further questions were asked at concerning alleged 
offensive actions by Mr. Behunin (T-468-469). 
The defendants were allowed to call Mr. Hadehaim, the 
contractor, who testified about Mr. Behunin watching them work on 
the patio in defendants' back yard. He testified that he worked 
for 4 or 5 days and noticed Mr. Behunin watching once from the 
roof and once tell an employee to not sit on the wall (T-475-479). 
The defendants called Mr. Gallegos who was allowed to 
testify that after the wall was erected the plaintiffs would go to 
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the front yard when they had quests at their door (T-499). He was 
directed to testify as to particular instances. He then testified 
to two occasions he could recall (T-500-504). 
The defendants called a witness, a neighbor, Mr. Kay 
Snow who testified concerning his observation of the relationship 
between the plaintiffs and the defendants. He testimony was 
general in nature as to types of activity he observed (T-526-527). 
The defendants called as a witness a neighbor, Mr. 
Edwin Christensen, who testified in a manner similar to Mr. Snow. 
(T-500-532) 
The defendants also called as a witness the persons who 
lived in the defendants' home prior to them. Their testimony as 
to the reputation of the Behunins was not permitted. They had no 
knowledge except from 16 years prior. The record already 
established that the parties had no disputes or privacy problems 
prior to the wall. 
In rebuttal to all of the foregoing, the defendants 
called the police officer whose testimony has been summarized and 
Mrs. VanDongen, a neighbor. She testified in a manner similar to 
the other neighbors, Mr. Snow and Mrs. Christensen, concerning her 
observation of the relations between the plaintiffs and 
defendants. (T-439-440). 
Thus, in summary it can be seen that defendants were 
not precluded from introducing evidence of possible intrusive 
behavior. The jury had before it abundant testimony to conclude a 
need for privacy. The jury was apparently not pursuaded. 
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(d) (h) and (i) Testimony about plaintiffs1 actions 
relating to possibly undermining the wall. The defendants1 
facination with the idea that the plaintiffs wanted to destroy the 
wall continually frustrated the court. Abundant testimony was 
permitted. Yet it became clear by all of defendants1 witnesses 
that this testimony was not relevant to the defendants1 claims or 
defenses to the extent of the testimony offered. The record is 
filled with testimony about watering the wall (T-475, 491, 
535-536) or watering ground around the wall, (T-467-468, 479, 480, 
527) shaking the wall (T-433, 466) or digging around the wall 
(T-467-468) including pictures of water puddling. Finally the 
court restricted further testimony on this subject. This is a 
prime example of where evidence was limited because it was already 
excessively permitted by the court. As the court said it was a 
"time waster". 
(f) and (g) The defendants tesitifed concerning their 
understanding of the stipulation prior to the objections. The 
objectionable testimony was repetitious. The testimony of the 
plaintiff concerning the language of the complaint was properly 
excluded as not having been her language but her attorney's which 
she testified she hadn!t really read (T-397). 
The foregoing detailed analysis of the record 
demonstrates that the court did not abuse it's discretion in 
ruling on the admissability of evidence. The defendants had full 
opportunity to present their evidence and defenses. Thus the 
errors alleged, if there were any, were not preducial so as to 
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have a substantial influence on the verdict as required for remand 
under Rules 103 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence; Rule 61 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Stagmeyer v. Leathum Bros, Inc., 20 
U.2d 421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968) and McCardell, supra. It is clear 
that the jury chose not to believe the evidence presented by the 
defendants but rather to believe the testimony of the plaintiffs. 
IV. 
THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF GRANTED IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
The Order of the Court granting injunctive relief is 
made pursuant to the provisions of Article VIII, Section 19 of the 
Utah Constitution providing that: 
There shall be but one form of civil 
action, and law and equity may be 
administered in the same action. 
This section as interpreted by the Utah Court in 
actions seeking injunctive relief, provides that the determination 
does «jof 
by the jury of issues of fact and damages ^©xpreclude the court 
from granting injunctive relief. See Salt Lake City v. Anderson, 
106 U 350, 148 P.2d 346 (1944). 
As already cited, the provisions of Section 78-38-1 
Utah Code Annotated provided that ". . .by judgment the nuisance 
may be enjoined or abated11. The language of the courtf s 
Ordercarrying out the constitutional and statutory responsibility, 
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merely echos the findings of the jury concerning it's 
interpretation of the stipulation and the findings of nuisance. 
The language is not overly broad. 
The injunctive relief ordered is consistent with the 
injunctive relief ordered in similar cases by the courts of 
Wyoming in Hudson and Schork, supra; and the Utah court in Wade v. 
Fuller, supra. It is consistent with the policy of the court to 
avoid duplicity of lawsuits and to grant relief on one action to 
the extent possible. 
The defendants cite no Utah authority for their 
position that the injunction is a taking where the prescribed 
author-fey is/nuisance, or prohibited by contract. 
CONCLUSION 
The finding of the jury should be sustained and the 
injunction imposed by the court affirmed. The stipulation was 
properly interpreted to preclude the subsequent barriers. The 
finding of the jury was, consistent with law of spite fence 
nuisance either under the American Rule which was properly 
explained to the jury or under the broader nuisance provisions of 
Utah law. The Court should abandon the dicta of Rowley and adopt 
the better rule of Dahl and Neuberger. 
DATED this £&- day of March, 1985. 
.
<
^ 7 rvtMu J 
STEVEN F. ALDER" 
Attorney for 
Plaintiffs/Respondents 
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